Month: February 2018



One of the reasons many of you got into Bitcoin was the fact that it was decentralized. But did you know that this is slowly changing? More and more of the network hashrate is starting to become concentrated into the hands of one man and his company. The security of our network essentially depends on them acting honourably, and us being prepared to respond to it. They get more powerful each day.

Based on conservative estimates of gross margin of 75 percent and operating margin of 65 percent, Bernstein analysts calculate that Beijing-based Bitmain made $3 billion to $4 billion in operating profits in 2017.
As long as they control the majority of the hash rate, the only way to keep the network secure is the threat of a hard fork to a new PoW, but this will only work for as long the community is reasonably small and still overwhelmingly shares the same morals for a decentralized Bitcoin.

In a decentralized system, we shouldn’t be put into a position where we rely on a centralized point of failure to behave themselves. People talk about “new entrants” to the mining scene, but it’s almost impossible for anyone to catch up to the total domination of the mining space by BITMAIN. They are light years ahead. That $4 billion dollars of profit will be used to build even better hardware, allowing them to further dominate mining for the foreseeable future and likely buy stakes in their competitors.

The hashrate has already been abused to give political support to reckless and dangerous hard fork attempts. They have questionable allegiance to Bitcoin at best, seeming more interested in supporting Bitcoin Cash, undermining the very network that employs them. Even more dangerously, they are based in China, a country with a long track of human rights abuses, censorship, and generally evil behaviour. The miners are in a position where the Chinese government can take over their equipment at any time; something they will no doubt do if Bitcoin grows enough to allow them to use their control of the hashrate to push a Chinese geopolitical agenda.

The more Bitcoin grows, the harder it becomes to hard fork. If it’s this bad right now, it could be even worse in a few years time, but by then it will be too late. We don’t want our transactions being decided by the Chinese government. The solution is to adopt a new hybrid PoW system, possibly with a PoS combination, and choosing algorithms that are very easy and simple to build ASICs for. The playing field needs to be even again, and structured in a way where it’s harder for one entity to dominate it.

The truth is that PoW provides very little security if it isn’t distributed effectively among multiple independent participants. This is historically why mining pools were very careful to avoid accumulating too much hashrate. But now we have a situation where one man controls the majority of the hashrate, and we are OK with that so long as he behaves himself. Imagine if someone followed you around with a gun pressed against your head, and you were OK with this because “he is incentivized to not shoot me because of the threat of jail”, people would call you stupid and crazy, and yet when it comes to Bitcoin, we’re totally fine with thinking along those lines.

Economic incentives only work when broadly applied to many participants. If mining was distributed among 100 independent miners, each with 1% hashrate, spread all over the world, you can trust the economic incentives to work as expected. It’s much less likely for something to happen that would take control of 51 of those miners. However, if you have like 3 miners who matter, with 2/3 of them in one country, these incentives break down. Maybe their government takes their equipment, or they’re insane, or they are just evil.

This mining problem is the root cause of all of Bitcoin’s problems. It’s the miners that have supported every hostile attempt to take over the network. It’s the miners who block new features for their strange political agenda. It’s the miners who lend support to altcoins that undermine Bitcoin. We need to get rid of them while we still can, they’re no longer a useful part of our community. Hard forks are scary, but let’s not be afraid to at least try to build consensus when we can all see the problem right in front of us.


你们中许多人进入比特币的原因之一是它是去中心化的。 但是你知道这个正在慢慢改变吗? 越来越多的网络算力开始集中到一个人和他的公司手中。 我们网络的安全性在很大程度上取决于他们的行为是否光荣,我们只能做出回应。 而且他们每天都会变得更强大。


在一个去中心化的体系中,我们不应该只依靠一个中心化的节点来自我约束。 人们谈论挖矿的“新进入者”,但任何人都无法赶上比特大陆对比特币挖矿的统治。 他们有光明的未来。 这笔40亿美元的利润将会用于构建更好的硬件,使他们能够在可预见的未来进一步主宰采矿业,并可能购买竞争对手的股份。

算力已经被滥用来给鲁莽和危险的硬分叉尝试提供政治支持。 他们对比特币的忠诚度很可疑,似乎对支持比特币现金更感兴趣。 更危险的是,他们总部在China,这个国家长期存在侵犯人权的行为,审查制度和各种恶行。China 当局可能随时没收掉矿工的设备, 如果比特币增长到足以让他们利用他们对算力的控制来推动China的地缘政治议程,他们肯定会这样做。

比特币增长越快,越难分叉。 如果现在这种情况很糟糕,几年后可能会更糟,但到那时就太迟了。 我们不希望我们的交易由China政府决定。 解决方案是采用新的混合PoW系统,可能与PoS组合,并选择非常容易和简单的算法来构建ASIC。 再次开启一个人人都能挖矿的时代,并且要以一个实体难以支配比特币的方式进行组织。

事实是,如果PoW没有在多个独立参与者之间有效分发,PoW提供的安全性非常低。 这是历史上为什么采矿池非常小心避免积累过多的算力。 但是现在我们有一种情况:一个人控制大部分算力,只能依靠他自我约束。 试想一下,如果有人用枪顶着你的头,但你觉得OK,只是因为“因为监狱的威胁,所以他没必要杀掉我”,人们会觉得你为愚蠢和疯狂的,但谈到比特币的时候,似乎这就OK了。

经济激励措施只有在广泛应用于许多参与者时才有效。 如果矿业分布在100个独立的矿工中,每个矿工有1%的算力,传播到世界各地,你可以相信经济激励机制能够完美地运作。 发生这种事情的可能性要小得多,比如控制51名矿工。 但是,如果你有三名重要的矿工,其中三分之二在一个国家,这些激励措施就会失效。 也许他们的政府拿走他们的装备,或者他们疯了,或者他们只是邪恶。

这个挖矿问题是所有比特币问题的根本原因。 矿工们支持每一次企图接管比特币网络的敌意。 是矿工经常屏蔽比特币的种种新特性,只因为某些特殊的政治主张。 这是支持破坏比特币,支持山寨币的的矿工。 我们需要尽快摆脱它们,它们不再是我们社区中有用的一部分。 硬分叉是可怕的,但当我们都能看到问题在我们面前时,我们不要害怕至少尝试建立共识。

Two New Hardware Bugs Affect Most Devices, Private Keys Vulnerable

Two New Hardware Bugs Affect Most Devices, Private Keys Vulnerable

Two New Hardware Bugs Affect Most Devices, Private Keys Vulnerable

Researchers have published a report on two hardware bugs that allow programs to steal sensitive data on affected devices, which is “most” devices worldwide.

For crypto users, these bugs are a direct threat to the security of their private keys, making the need for secure hardware storage of crypto funds even more pressing.

How do the bugs work?

The two bugs, known as Meltdown and Spectre, exploit security vulnerabilities in Intel, AMD, and ARM processors in any device, including PCs, laptops, tablets, and smartphones.

Meltdown affects all devices with Intel chips, which are estimated to be in 90% of all computers (desktop and laptop combined), the BBC reported.

Spectre potentially has an even wider reach, affecting Intel, ARM, and AMD chips in any kind of device. Meltdown and Spectre also work in the cloud.

The BBC also reported that the tech industry kept the threat a secret for up to six months via non-disclosure agreements, but now fears are mounting that public awareness could lead to real-life exploits.

Protecting your funds

Bitcoin core developer Jonas Schnelli referred to the newly reported security flaws in terms of how they affect Bitcoin users, laying out three steps to secure cryptocurrency holdings:

Pavol Rusnak, the CTO of TREZOR manufacturer SatoshiLabs, tweeted Jan. 4 to confirm that its devices are unaffected by Meltdown and Spectre, noting:

“Using a (hardware) wallet is now more important than ever.”

In October 2017, the Ledger Nano S hardware wallet was number eight in the list of top ten best selling items on Amazon’s Computers and Accessories section. Today, Jan.4, the Ledger Nano S is number one.




“本文主要总结以太坊智能合约的安全漏洞。新加坡国立大学的Loi Luu提出了现在的智能合约存在的几种安全漏洞。然而,由于智能合约目前还只是初级阶段,相信各种安全问题会不断的发现。 ”













有个名叫KingOfTheEtherThrone(KoET)的智能合约:用户可以通过一定数量的以太币成为“以太币国王”,支付的数额由现任国王决定。很显然,当前国王可以通过买卖国王获得利润。当一个用户声称为国王后,合约就发送赔偿金给现任国王,并指定这个用户为新的国王。然而,这个合约并没有检查支付赔偿金的交易的结果。 这样一旦合约在执行过程中产生了异常,现任国王就有可能同时失去王座和赔偿金。







EOS with DPOS is immune to the GFW attack _because it is more decentralised_

EOS with DPOS is immune to the GFW attack _because it is more decentralised_

Rumours are continuing to circulate that China is going to regulate all crypto. The rumours include closing down mining and chopping off Bitcoin itself in the great fire wall (GFW) that controls the in/out pipes for the Internet. However, one letter circulated that claims all this appears to be a fake, but it’s scared many nonetheless.

Can they shut down the mining? Probably, and to much larger extent than the other governments. The reasons are twofold – censorship is a normal part of life there, and the regulations are much stricter, so (1) censorship works. If you couple this to the fact that the mining companies are big and consume a lot of resource, then we can see them as obvious – (2) big hash factories are hard to hide. Therefore, it is fairly likely that an instruction to cease & desist will be taken seriously. And voluntarily. And there won’t be any mucking around with secret nets or pigeon IP or ham radio.


So, the potential attack on Bitcoin and Ethereum is plausible, notwithstanding the likely fake news status of it right now. The ramifications are that about 80% of the mining hashpower would be sliced off, as well as Bitcoin use being isolated within the country. One could even see a potential for Bitcoin to fork into in-country and ex-country chains, something that would align with PRC interests but maybe not with anyone else.

Curiously, and arguably intentionally, DPOS is more or less immune to this attack. The reasons are simply that (a) DPOS is far more decentralised than mining and (b) DPOS responds to the shock of country regulation quickly and without losing any efficacy.

Mining is more centralised because the forces of centralisation (or economies of scale) on it are much stronger: Bitcoin and Ethereum mining need huge amounts of electricity. As outlined in an old paper (Güring & Grigg 2011), hashing goes to where the electricity is cheapest. Which currently is in places like Inner Mongolia for various reasons that aren’t going away. Further, it’s not enough to have a few boxes and great net, you have to be a big warehouse. Which means we know where they all are, and they can’t move, easily. Lots of electricity, lots of boxes, lots of money, lots of workers: These are highly centralised installations.

In contrast, the resources used in DPOS are much lighter. They aren’t as subject to local circumstances, and are much more easily moved. Basically, each block producer needs a few big boxes with good net. Which exists in most countries, there are even hobby/volunteer sites like Funkfueur in Vienna that would fit the bill, and many countries deliver real fast net to the home with fibre which would likely be enough for a year or two.

More, the producers can be re-appointed by the community within the space of a round – approximately a minute. So the moment a large country decides to act, the community can respond as and when it is bothered – by voting to replace the suspect nodes with others ex-country. This can be done on rumour, or we can wait until those nodes drop off, and then repair the network knowing where to repair.

All this with zero change to the effective block production, and the risk to that production, because there is a ready pool of waiting block producers. Whereas a successful China attack will result in an 80% drop in hashrate around the world and thus the potential for a fork.

That’s the theory – how do the numbers stack up? If we choose 75% as a suitable indicator of effective decentralisation, we can eyeball the chart (above) and see that 8 mining pools do 75% of all hashing for Bitcoin. Ethereum (below) is even worse at 5!


Meanwhile, DPOS is mathematical as the blocks are distributed 1 per round across 21 producers, each round, and then shuffled. Then, 75% of 21 producers is … 16, rounded up, as it was with the others.

Hence, DPOS is far more decentralised than either Bitcoin or Ethereum, by a factor of 2 or 3 if the 75% metric is any guide. The fact that there are many thousands of nodes in a Bitcoin or Ethereum blockchain isn’t relevant if the chain is dominated by only a small number of pools, and those pools exist in known, accounted-for places vulnerable to a forking attack. Like China. Like 80%.






基于Blockchain Security Lab(BSL)对Bitcoin网络以及其他代币(包括以太坊、莱特币)的安全状况及攻击事件的跟踪,我们预警将在近期发生不可估量的安全事件,这可能动摇Bitcoin的根基,影响整个加密货币体系的安全。比特币网络的重大缺陷将可能引发这场“终极打击”,我们的专家团队已开始尝试修复存在的漏洞,修补后的新链和钱包将以最快的速度上线,代码将全部公布,用户可以在Github查询。


为了以示区隔和避免替代比特币这样的争议,我们将分叉后的新链代币称之为Obscure Bitcoin(OBTC,隐币或原币)。OBTC数量2.1亿,仅增发210万枚代币用于捐赠给此次发现漏洞的安全专家和参与修补Bitcoin的核心团队。在分叉高度下持有BTC的用户,将获得等额的OBTC,免费领取。




分叉后,哈希难度将会降低。以激励先知的矿工、矿池,能够更积极的抢救性参与“备份”。后续的充提与交易,我们会根据OBTC区块的稳定性和可靠性而决定。遇到任何问题,请联系 OBTC 官方邮箱 [email protected],我们将尽量第一时间为您解决疑问。











01 黑产转型




























02 秘密集结

































6月17日,众筹超过1.5亿美元的分布式自治组织The DAO,遭受黑客攻击,导致360万个以太币被盗。










03 黑箱洗币






















04 利益漩涡





























转载来源 一本区块链

The Ripple story

The Ripple story

Abstract: In this piece, we briefly look over the history of Ripple and examine various disputes between the founders and partner companies, typically over control of XRP tokens. We then explore elements of the technology behind Ripple. We conclude that the apparent distributed consensus mechanism doesn’t serve a clear purpose, because the default behaviour of Rippled nodes effectively hands full control over updating the ledger to the server. Therefore, in our view, Ripple does not appear to share many of the potentially interesting characteristics crypto tokens like Bitcoin or Ethereum may have, at least from a technical perspective.

Jed McCaleb (left) joined Ripple in 2011. Chris Larsen (right) joined the company in 2012. (Source: BitMEX Research)


On 4 January 2018, the Ripple (XRP) price reached a high of $3.31, an incredible gain of  51,709% since the start of 2017. This represented a market capitalization of $331 billion, putting Ripple’s valuation in the same league as Google, Apple, Facebook, Alibaba, and Amazon — the largest tech giants in the world. According to Forbes, Chris Larsen, the executive chairman of Ripple, owns 17% of the company and controls 5.19 billion XRP, worth around $50 billion at the time of the peak, making him one of the richest people in the world. Despite this incredible valuation, many of the market participants do not appear to know much about Ripple’s history or the technology behind it. In this piece, we provide an overview of the history of Ripple and look at some of its technical underpinnings.

History of Ripple

RipplePay: 2004 to 2012

Ryan Fugger founded a company he called RipplePay in 2004. The core idea behind the protocol was a peer-to-peer trust network of financial relations that would replace banks.

The RipplePay logo during that period of the company’s existence. (Source:

RipplePay’s basic theory was as follows:

  • All banks do is make and receive loans. A bank deposit is a loan to the bank from the customer.
  • A payment from Bob to Alice in the traditional banking system is simply an update to their respective loan balances to the bank, with Bob’s loan to the bank declining slightly and Alice’s increasing slightly.
  • RipplePay held that one could replace banks by creating a peer-to-peer trust network in which individuals could directly loan each other, and alterations to these loan balances enable payments.
  • Payments, then, are simply updates to these loan balances, provided the system can find a path of relationships from the payer to the recipient.

In this example, the person on the far right side of the lineup makes a payment of $20 to the person on the far left. Although the payer and recipient do not directly trust each other, the payment transfers through a chain of IOUs forged of seven people who are linked by six trusted relationships. (Source:

The network architecture is not dissimilar to the idea behind the Lightning Network, except with counterparty risk, something which Lightning avoids. In our view, this model is likely to be unstable and the trust networks are unlikely to be regarded as reliable — and therefore we are unsure of its efficacy. Either the system would centralise towards a few large banks and fail to be sufficiently different to the existing financial system or it would be liable to regular defaults. However, the current Ripple system is very different to this original idea.

At the start of 2011, Bitcoin was gaining some significant traction and began to capture the attention of Ripple’s target demographic. To some extent, Bitcoin had succeeded where Ripple had failed, building a peer-to-peer payment network with what appeared to be a superior architecture to Ripple. In May 2011, Jed McCaleb, an early Bitcoin pioneer, joined Ripple, perhaps to address some of these concerns.

McCaleb had founded the Mt. Gox Bitcoin exchange in 2010, which he sold to Mark Karpeles in March 2011. According to an analysis of the failure of Mt. Gox by WizSec’s Kim Nilsson, the platform was already insolvent, to the tune of 80,000 BTC and $50,000, in March 2011 when McCaleb sold it. Shortly after this, Ryan Fugger handed the reins of the Ripple project to McCaleb.

OpenCoin: September 2012 to September 2014

The Ripple logo during the OpenCoin period. (Source:

In 2012, McCaleb hired Chris Larsen, who remains on the board today as the executive chairman and whom the current website describes as a co-founder of Ripple. This marked the start of the OpenCoin era, the first of three name changes between 2012 and 2015. Larsen is the former chairman and CEO of E-Loan, a company he co-founded in 1996, took public in 1999 at the height of the tech bubble, and then sold to Banco Popular in 2005. Larsen then founded Prosper Marketplace, a peer-to-peer lending platform, which he left to join Ripple in 2012.

Larsen is not new to volatile prices and price bubbles. E-Loan experienced a peak-to-trough fall of 99.1% between 1999 and 2001. E-Loan’s IPO share price stood at $14 on 28 June 1999 before selling for $4.25 per share in 2005. (Source: Bloomberg)

To address the success of Bitcoin, Ripple now planned to allow Bitcoin payments on its network, potentially as a base currency for settlement. This period also marked the launch of the Ripple Gateway structure. The community realized that the peer-to-peer structure did not seem to work, with ordinary users unwilling to trust counterparties sufficiently to make the network usable for payments. To address this, Ripple decided to form gateways, large businesses that many users would be able to trust. This was said to be a  compromise, a hybrid system between traditional banking and a peer-to-peer network.

How Ripple gateways work. (Source:

In late 2012, OpenCoin opposed the usage of the name “Ripple Card” by Ripple Communications, a telecom company that predated the launch of the Ripple payment network. This may illustrate the start of a change in culture of the company, with a willingness to use the law to protect the company, and a change in strategy to focus more on the Ripple brand.

Ripple Communications is an unrelated telecom company based in Nevada that held the domain and used the Ripple name before the Ripple payment network came into being. (Source: Internet Archive)

In October 2012, Jesse Powell, the founder and CEO of the Kraken exchange (which launched in 2011) and close friend of McCaleb, participated in Ripple’s first seed round with an investment believed to total around $200,000. Roger Ver is also said to have been an early investor in Ripple, apparently investing “before even the creators knew what it was going to be”.

XRP token launch: January 2013

Ripple released its XRP coin in January 2013. Like Bitcoin, XRP is based on a public chain of cryptographic signatures, and therefore did not require the initial web of trust or gateway design. XRP could be sent directly from user to user, without the gateways or counterparty risk, which was the method used for all currencies on Ripple, including USD. Ripple perhaps intended XRP to be used in conjunction with the web of trust structure for USD payments — for example, to pay transaction fees. The company set the supply of XRP at a high level of 100 billion, with some claiming this would help Ripple prevent sharp price appreciation. Critics argued that the XRP token may not have been a necessary component of the network.

In April 2013, OpenCoin received $1.5 million in funding from Google Ventures, Andreessen Horowitz, IDG Capital Partners, FF Angel, Lightspeed Venture Partners, the Bitcoin Opportunity Fund, and Vast Ventures. This was the first in many rounds of venture funding and it included some of the most respected venture-capital companies in the world.

McCaleb left the project sometime between June 2013 and May 2014. Although his departure appears to have only been widely discussed within the Ripple community starting in May 2014, later statements from the company indicates he ended his involvement in June 2013 when Stefan Thomas took over as CTO. Thomas had created the We Use Coins website in March 2011 and the 2011 “What is Bitcoin?” YouTube video.

McCaleb appears to have disagreed with Larsen on strategy and then was seemingly forced out of the project, based on support Larsen received from the new venture-capital investors. After leaving Ripple, McCaleb went on to found Stellar in 2014, a project said to be based on some of the original principles behind Ripple.

Ripple Labs: September 2013 to October 2015

In September 2013, OpenCoin became Ripple Labs.

In February 2014, Ripple implemented the “balance freeze” feature, which it activated in August 2014. This allowed Ripple gateways to freeze or even confiscate coins from any user of its gateway, even without a valid signature for the transaction. The motivation of this was said to be to enable gateways to comply with regulatory requirements, for example, a court order demanding the confiscation of funds. The default setting for a gateway was to have the freeze feature enabled, but it was possible for a gateway to disable this option by using a “NoFreeze” flag, such that tokens a gateway owed could not be frozen or confiscated using this feature. The largest gateway at the time, Bitstamp, did not opt out of the freeze feature.

In May 2015, regulatory authorities in the United States fined Ripple Labs $700,000 for violating the Bank Secrecy Act by selling XRP without obtaining the required authorisation. Ripple additionally agreed to remedial measures, the most onerous of which are summarised below:

  • Ripple Labs must register with FinCEN.
  • If Ripple gives away any more XRP, those recipients must register their account information and provide identification details to Ripple.
  • Ripple must comply with AML regulations and appoint a compliance officer.
  • Ripple must be subject to an external audit.
  • Ripple must provide data or tools to the regulators that allows them to analyse Ripple transactions and the flow of funds.

Ripple: October 2015 to present

In October 2015, the company simplified its name to Ripple.

The current Ripple logo. (Source:

In September 2016, Ripple raised $55 million in funding in a round lead by Japan’s leading online retail stock-brokering company, SBI Holdings (8473 JP). SBI acquired a 10.5% stake in Ripple. As we mentioned in our “Public companies with exposure to the crypto space” piece, this is part of a wide range of SBI investments into crypto. SBI and Ripple have set up a joint venture, SBI Ripple Asia, which is 60% owned by SBI and 40% owned by Ripple. The company is hoping to provide a settlement platform using Ripple’s “distributed financial technology”.

In September 2017, R3, another blockchain company, sued Ripple. R3 argued that Ripple agreed in September 2016 to give it the option to buy 5 billion XRP at an exercise price of $0.0085 before September 2019. At the peak, the intrinsic value of this call option was worth around $16.5 billion. R3 alleges that in June 2017, Ripple terminated the contract, despite having no right to do so. Ripple then filed a counter case, alleging that R3 did not honour its side of the original 2016 agreement by failing to introduce Ripple to a large number of banking clients or to promote XRP for usage in these banking systems. As of February 2018, the case is unresolved.

Ripple supply and company reserves

When Ripple was founded, it created 100 billion XRP tokens of which 80 billion tokens were allocated to the company and 20 billion were given to the three founders. Here is an approximate breakdown of the distribution of those tokens:

  • The Ripple company received 80 billion XRP.
  • Chris Larsen received 9.5 billion.
    • In 2014, Larsen committed to put 7 billion XRP of this 9.0 billion into a charitable foundation.
  • Jed McCaleb received 9.5 billion. Upon leaving Ripple:
    • McCaleb retained 6.0 billion (subject to lock up agreement).
    • McCaleb’s children received 2.0 billion (subject to lock up agreement).
    • 1.5 billion was given to charity and other family members of McCaleb (not subject to lock up agreement).
  • Arthur Britto received 1.0 billion (subject to lock up agreement).

When McCaleb left Ripple, there were concerns he was, could or would dump his XRP into the market and crash the price. McCaleb and Ripple constructed the following agreement to prevent this by restricting the sale of XRP. The agreement was revised in 2016 after Ripple accused McCaleb of violating the initial terms.

2014 agreement
  • McCaleb’s sales are limited to $10,000 per week during the first year.
  • Sales are limited to $20,000 per week during the second, third, and fourth years.
  • Sales are limited to 750 million XRP per year for the fifth and sixth years.
  • Sales are limited to 1 billion XRP per year for the seventh year.
  • Sales are limited to 2 billion XRP per year after the seventh year.


As for the 80 billion XRP held by the Ripple company, the plan was to sell or give away this balance, use the funds to fund company operations, and to use it to seed global money-transfer gateways. As the Ripple wiki says:

XRP cannot be debased. When the Ripple network was created, 100 billion XRP was created. The founders gave 80 billion XRP to the Ripple Labs. Ripple Labs will develop the Ripple software, promote the Ripple payment system, give away XRP, and sell XRP.

From December 2014 to July 2015, the company disclosed on its website the amount of XRP it held, the amount in circulation, and indirectly (by mentioning a reserve) the amount spent on company operations. The company did not distinguish between what it sold and what it gave away for free. The disclosure for 30 June 2015 is shown below.


Some time after July 2015 the disclosure was modified, with the reserve balance no longer available. Since at least late 2017 Ripple disclosed three figures, the “XRP held by Ripple”, “XRP distributed” and “XRP to be placed in escrow”. As at 31 January 2018, the balances are as follows:

  • 7.0 billion XRP held by Ripple
  • 39.0 billion XRP distributed
  • 55.0 billion XRP placed in escrow

We have been unable to link or reconcile the old Ripple reserve figure with the new XRP held by Ripple figure, therefore we are unsure how much the company has spent on its own operations across the entire period. However, we have analysed the information disclosed in the old way prior to July 2015, 12 data points in total, in addition to forum posts from the company’s current chief cryptographer David Schwartz (regarded as one of the main architects of Ripple’s technology, who goes by the name JoelKatz online and is said to have had 1 billion XRP). The following charts present our findings related to the distribution or spend of XRP.

XRP holdings from 2013 to 2015 – billion. (Source: BitMEX Research,


XRP distribution (sales to partners plus XRP given away) and XRP spent on company operations – billions. The crosses represent points where information was available. We are not aware of why the amount spent on company operations appears to decline towards the end of 2015. (Sources:,,


XRP in circulation – billions. (Source:,,, Coinmarketcap/new Ripple disclosure)

The data shows that Ripple sold or distributed 12.5 billion XRP from January 2013 to July 2015. We have been unable to determine how many XRP were sold, at what price, or how many were given away. The company spent at least 4 billion XRP on company operations between March 2014 and July 2015 but there are no details of what this was spent on, as far as we can tell.


Dispute between the company founders

As we alluded above, McCaleb did not part with the company on the best of terms. In May 2014, early Ripple investor Jesse Powell described the situation:

Since Jed’s departure, the management of the company has taken a different direction. Sadly, the vision Jed and I had for the project in the early days has been lost. I’m no longer confident in the management nor the company’s ability to recover from the founders’ perplexing allocation to themselves of 20% of the XRP, which I had hoped until recently would be returned. Prior to Jed’s departure from Ripple, I had asked the founders to return their XRP to the company. Jed agreed but Chris [Larsen] declined — leaving a stalemate. This afternoon, I revisited the allocation discussion with the pair and again, where Jed was open, Chris was hostile.

Ripple responded to Powell with a claim that he was spreading false and defamatory information in violation of his obligations as a Ripple board member. The letter states:

In fact, as Chris has stated previously in discussions with you and Jed, he has been and remains willing to return most of his founders’ XRP to Ripple Labs.

Powell retorted that Larsen would return only a portion of his XRP to the company, and rather than giving it back, this would be a loan. Powell ends the letter by explaining how he sees the situation with respect to the 20 billion XRP granted to the founders and the formation of Ripple:

Jed and I got started with Ripple in September of 2011. I believe Chris joined sometime around August of 2012. Prior to Chris joining, the company had two investors. I’m not sure when Jed and Chris allocated themselves the XRP but they say it was before incorporation, which occurred in September of 2012. In my view, the two stole company assets when they took the XRP without approval of the early investors, and without sharing the allocation amongst the other shareholders. Whatever coin they allocated themselves prior to incorporation of Opencoin, I believe was abandoned. There had been several ledger resets between Sep 2012 and Dec 2012, and a new version of Ripple emerged, built by Opencoin, clearly with company resources. If Jed and Chris have continued to run the old software to preserve their Betacoin, I have no problem. Unfortunately, Jed and Chris again allocated themselves XRP in December of 2012. That XRP unquestionably was not gifted by Jed and Chris to the company, it did not exist prior to the company’s existence, and it was generated with company resources. That XRP has always belonged to the company and it was taken from the company by Jed and Chris. I’m asking them to return what they’ve stolen.

Powell continued to comment on the situation on the Ripple forum:

The board and investors have known about it for a long time. I’d been nudging them to return the XRP since I found out about it. Jed was always willing but Chris wasn’t, and Jed kept his share in case leverage was ever needed to more aggressively persuade Chris to return his portion. It wasn’t a regular topic of discussion and was just something I just imagined would work itself out when Chris got a grasp on the damage it was doing to Ripple’s image and adoption. If my goal had been to get my fair share, I probably would have been more proactive about it but I’d just assumed it would eventually be entirely returned to the company. I could have agreed to a small amount of XRP being paid out in lieu of cash compensation or instead of equity, but otherwise, we all should have bought our XRP at the market rate, like everyone else.

The company, through marketing VP Monica Long, then responded to the Powell’s continued public pressure with the following commitment:

Further, co-founder and CEO Chris Larsen has authorized the creation of a foundation to distribute his donation of 7 billion XRP to the underbanked and financially underserved. This plan has previously been in development but is now being accelerated and finalized independent of a formal agreement amongst all the original founders. He believes this is both the right thing to do and the best way to remove further distractions in pursuit of the broader vision of the company. Details of the foundation, its independent directors, and the giveaway will be forthcoming.

The above response appeared to divert the pressure on Ripple and Larsen that was building inside the Ripple community. The foundation that was set up is Ripple Works. We have reviewed the charity’s US tax filings for the fiscal years ended April 2015 and April 2016, which show the following donations of XRP:

Date Donor Amount (XRP)
November 2014 Chris Larsen 200 million
April 2015 Chris Larsen 500 million
July 2015 Chris Larsen 500 million
November 2016 Ripple Inc 1,000 million

As of April 2016, two years after the commitment, Larsen appears to have given at least 1.2 billion XRP out of the promised 7 billion XRP total to the foundation. We have not been able to obtain the filling for the year ended April 2017, as it may not be available yet.

The dispute and the Bitstamp Ripple freeze incident

In 2015, Ripple took advantage of the Ripple freeze feature instituted in August 2014. The Bitstamp gateway froze funds belonging to a family member of Jed McCaleb. Some consider this ironic: Ripple originally stated that the freeze feature was implemented to enable gateways to comply with orders from law enforcement yet the first actual usage of the feature appears to have been an order to comply with an instruction from the Ripple company itself, against one of the founders.

What appears to have happened is a family member of McCaleb sold 96 million XRP (perhaps part of the 2 billion XRP given to other family members and not part of the lock-up agreement) back to Ripple for around $1 million. After Ripple acquired the XRP for USD, Ripple appears to have asked Bitstamp to use the Ripple freeze feature to confiscate the $1 million Ripple had just used to buy the tokens. In 2015, Bitstamp took both Ripple and McCaleb to court, to determine the best course of action.

Court documents allege/reveal the following:

  • McCaleb had 5.5 billion XRP.
  • McCaleb’s two children held 2 billion XRP.
  • Another 1.5 billion XRP were held by charitable organizations and other family members.
  • In March 2015, Jacob Stephenson, a relative of McCaleb, offered to sell 96 million XRP to Ripple.
  • Ripple agreed to pay nearly $1 million to buy the 96 million XRP from Stephenson in a complicated transaction that “manipulated the market” to “improperly inflate the price per XRP of the transaction and mislead other purchasers”. As part of this, Ripple paid more than the cost and asked Stephenson to return an excess amount of $75,000.
  • Bitstamp’s chief legal officer was also an advisor to Ripple and as such there was a conflict of interest.

The dispute between McCaleb and Ripple continued until a final resolution in February 2016, when the company, implying that McCaleb had violated the 2014 XRP lock-up agreement, stated that a final settlement had been reached:

Jed exited Ripple back when it was OpenCoin in June 2013. He has played no role in the strategy or operations of Ripple since then. He has, however, held significant stakes of XRP and company shares. In August 2014, we shared the terms of a lock-up agreement that dictated timetables and limits within which Jed could sell XRP. The purpose of the agreement was to ensure distribution of his XRP in a way that would be constructive for the Ripple ecosystem. Since April 2015, Jed has been party to ongoing legal action related to alleged violation of the 2014 agreement.

McCaleb responded to this with his side of the story, indicating that he was also happy with the final agreement.

This week also sees the end of a longstanding issue. Stellar and I have finally reached a settlement with Ripple in the ongoing dispute between the parties. The settlement shows that Ripple’s claims were entirely baseless. Ripple has conceded in exchange for Stellar and I agreeing to settle the litigation.

Under the final agreement, McCaleb’s family member’s $1 million were unfrozen, Ripple agreed to pay all legal fees, and 2 billion XRP were freed for donation to charity. McCaleb would be free to sell his remaining XRP, perhaps over 5 billion XRP, consistent with the terms in the table below.

2014 agreement 2016 revised agreement
  • McCaleb’s sales are limited to $10,000 per week during the first year.
  • Sales are limited to $20,000 per week during the second, third, and fourth years.
  • Sales are limited to 750 million XRP per year for the fifth and sixth years.
  • Sales are limited to 1 billion XRP per year for the seventh year.
  • Sales are limited to 2 billion XRP per year after the seventh year.
  • McCaleb must donate 2 billion XRP to charity
  • McCaleb must retain title ownership of 5.3 billion XRP; however, Ripple will control the funds.
  • McCaleb and the charity will be able to collectively sell the following percentage of the average daily volume:
    • 0.5% in the first year,
    • 0.75% in years two and three,
    • 1.0% for the fourth year, and
    • 1.5% thereafter.


The Ripple consensus process

The consensus system

The Ripple technology appears to have gone through several iterations, but a core part of the marketing of Ripple is the consensus process. In 2014, Ripple used the image below to illustrate the consensus system, which seems to be an iterative process with servers making proposals and nodes only accepting these proposals if certain quorum conditions are met. An 80% threshold of the servers is considered a key level and once this threshold is crossed, a node regards the proposal as final. The image depicts some complexity in the process and the BitMEX Research team is unable to understand the detailed inner workings of the system or how it has any of the convergent properties necessary for consensus systems.

(Source: Ripple wiki)

In January 2018, the BitMEX Research team installed and ran a copy of Rippled for the purpose of this report. The node operated by downloading a list of five public keys from the server, as the screenshot below shows. All five keys are assigned to The software indicates that four of the five keys are required to support a proposal in order for it to be accepted. Since the keys were all downloaded from the server, Ripple is essentially in complete control of moving the ledger forward, so one could say that the system is centralised. Indeed, our node indicates that the keys expire on 1 February 2018 (just a few days after the screenshot), implying the software will need to visit’s server again to download a new set of keys.

A screenshot of Rippled in operation. (Source: BitMEX Research)

Of course, there is nothing wrong with centralised systems; the overwhelming majority of electronic systems are centralised. Centralisation makes systems easier to construct, more efficient, faster, cheaper to run, more effective at stopping double spends and easier to integrate into other systems. However, some Ripple marketing, like the image below, contends that the Ripple system is distributed, which some may consider misleading.


In addition to the potentially misleading marketing, the construction involving the quorum process and 80% threshold may not be necessary and merely adds to the obfuscation, in our view. Defenders of Ripple could argue that the list of five public keys is customizable, as one could manually edit the configuration file and type in whatever keys one wants. Indeed, there is a list of such validators on the Ripple website. However, there is no evidence that many users of Ripple manually change this configuration file.

Even if users were to modify the configuration file, this may not significantly help. In this circumstance, there is no particular reason to assume that the system would converge on one ledger. For example, one user could connect to five validators and another user could connect to five different validators, with each node meeting the 80% thresholds, but for two conflicting ledgers. The 80% quorum threshold from a group of servers has no convergent or consensus properties, as far as we can tell. Therefore, we consider this consensus process as potentially unnecessary.

Validation of the ledger

Although the consensus process is centralised, one could argue that in Ripple user nodes can still validate transaction data from all participants. This model can be said to provide some assurance or utility, despite its computational inefficiency. Although moving the ledger forward is a centralised process, if the Ripple servers process an invalid transaction, user nodes may reject those blocks and the entire network would then be stuck. This threat could keep the Ripple server honest. However, this threat may not be all that different from the existing user pressure and legal structures which keep traditional banks honest.

Apparently, Ripple is missing 32,570 blocks from the start of the ledger and nodes are not able to obtain this data. This means that one may be unable to audit the whole chain and the full path of Ripple’s original 100 billion XRP since launch. This could be of concern to some, especially given Powell’s comments, which indicate that there may have been resets of the ledger in the early period. David Schwartz explained the significance of the missing blocks:

It doesn’t mean anything for the average Ripple user. In January of 2013, a bug in the Ripple server caused ledger headers to be lost. All data from all running Ripple servers was collected, but it was insufficient to construct the ledgers. The raw transactions still survive, mixed with other transactions and with no information about which transaction went in which ledger. Without the ledger headers, there’s no easy way to reconstruct the ledgers. You need to know the hash of ledger N-1 to build ledger N, which complicates things.


Much of this report has focused on disputes, primarily related to control over XRP, including accusations of theft. Perhaps such disputes are not particularly unique, especially given the rapid, unexpected growth in the value of the ecosystem. In fact, this story of the disputes might not be too dissimilar from that of some of the large tech giants mentioned in the introduction to this piece.

More significant than the disputes is the fact that the Ripple system appears for all practical purposes to be centralised and is therefore perhaps devoid of any interesting technical characteristics, such as censorship resistance, which coins like Bitcoin may have — although this does not mean that Ripple or XRP is doomed to failure. The company has significant financial capital and has proven somewhat effective at marketing and forming business partnerships, and perhaps this could mean the company succeeds at building adoption of the XRP token either among businesses or consumers. If so, the points that Bitcoin critics often raise may be even more pertinent and relevant in the case of XRP. These points include:

  • The lack of inflation is a naive economic policy.
  • The price of the token is too volatile and speculative.
  • Regulators will shut the system down if it becomes popular.
  • Perhaps most importantly, why not use the US dollar? Banks will build competing digital systems based on traditional currencies (if they don’t exist already).

The real mystery about Ripple is that, given the large market value of the system, why are all the Bitcoin critics so silent? Perhaps the answer to this question is just as applicable to some of Bitcoin’s proponents as it is to its critics. Most people seem to judge things on what they perceive as the culture and character of those involved, rather than on the technical fundamentals.


Whilst many claims made in this note are cited, we do not guarantee accuracy. We welcome corrections.





根据《麻省理工科技评论》在 1 月 18 日发布的最新文章中,有最新研究表明,当前区块链技术中最大的两个加密货币体系——比特币与以太坊——背后实际上存在隐形权力结构,这一研究结果相当于直接提出了一个非常尖锐的问题:比特币与以太坊是否具备区块链技术追随着所信仰的“去中心化”(Decentralized)特性?

※ 论文地址:

在此报道中提到,在加密货币圈,如果把某件事称作是“中心化的”(Centralized),就是一种侮辱,而在目前所有加密货币体系奉为精神圭臬的“去中心化”,这一说法源于比特币创始人中本聪(Satoshi Nakamoto),意思是指货币体系的运转并不需要像政府或金融机构这样的中央集权机构。值得注意的是,在当前关于加密货币的好坏之争中,“去中心化”显然是最重要的判断标准。因为所谓好的加密货币就是“去中心化”的,而任何跟“中心化”扯上一点关系的加密货币都是坏货币,而且会威胁到加密货币成为世界全新金融体系载体,进而破坏这一乌托邦式的未来。

早在一年前就指出当时方兴未艾的多种加密货币存有先天上不可忽略漏洞的康奈尔大学加密货币专家 Emin Gün Sirer 认为,在很多情况下,中心还是存在的,但之所以会有这样似是而非的争论,主要是因为大家都懒得认真审视这些网络的去中心化程度差异。不过在当时,Gün Sirer 也表示,“我们目前还没有任何实际的数据来支撑这一观点。”然而,Gün Sirer 的团队展开了长达两年的研究,并终于在近期发布了针对比特币和以太坊这两大全球最受欢迎的加密货币网络的研究结果,举出多项数据支持他的观点。


在 Gün Sirer 的研究中,最惊人的发现是,无论是比特币还是以太坊中的挖矿,均未实现真正意义上去中心化。所谓挖矿就是验证交易,防止区块链账本遭受攻击的过程。比特币和以太坊都属于开放区块链系统,即原则上任何人都可以成为矿工,但因为这样的架构特性,自然形成了相应的组织集中挖矿资源。

研究人员发现,基于每周一次的统计,排名前四名的比特币挖掘活动就占整个系统挖掘活动的 53%;而以太坊挖掘活动的中心化程度甚至更加稳固,前 3 大矿机占整体系统每周平均挖掘活动高达 61%。同时,研究人员还发现,56% 的比特币“节点”,也就是全球运行比特币挖掘软件的计算机(并不是所有计算机都从事挖矿),都位于数据中心,相比之下只有 28% 的以太坊节点位于数据中心。Gün Sirer 解读此一现象认为,这或许说明比特币的挖矿行为已然较以太坊更加企业化。

根据以上相关数据,Gün Sirer 的团队得出结论,在“中心化”这件事上,比特币和以太坊这两大网络半斤八两。实际上,针对“去中心化”意义的整体讨论范围更加广泛,情况更加复杂。现在有上百种加密货币,许多加密货币的运作方式与比特币和以太坊并不相同。并不是所有的加密货币都是依赖矿机或者需要使用区块链的。

没有绝对完美的方式来衡量加密货币网络的去中心化程度,它十分复杂,既是一个社会性的问题也是一个技术性的问题。举例来说,货币在网络中被分配的方式起着至关重要的作用。在瑞波币(Ripple)中,Ripple 这家私人公司就扮演货币监管分配,而且掌握着一半以上的货币量。此文在最后指出,关于去中心化的讨论或许晦涩难懂,但任何一个对加密货币未来感兴趣的人都应该尽力去了解。在该技术的大力提倡者描绘的愿景中,去中心化有利于解决传统中心机构引起的不公平问题。但如果加密货币也只是一种让财富和权力重新分配到少数人手中的新手段,那么,这就说明并没有什么革命性的突破。


2017 年 1 月 20 日,DT君曾发表了一篇关于比特币在 2013 年价格疑似受到操纵的文章,并以该次事件推论出比特币其实非常“中心化”,而且其价格很容易受到操纵。虽然该文章是以比特币持有者在交易时间节点上的重合作为判断依据,从而得出结论,但是从技术上来讲,所谓分布式、点对点交易的比特币,也是有可能被操纵的。


传统的中心化模式下,客户与客户必须围绕中介组织、中介机构进行业务活动,客户之间难以达成直接的业务关系。分布式结构则为实现点对点的交易提供了基础,使得证券的发行、转让、清算、交收可以绕过传统的中介组织、中介机构,进而为提升效率、节约成本创造条件。由此来看,狭义的区块链即是去中心化系统各节点共享的数据账本。每个分布式节点都可以通过特定的哈希算法和 Merkle 树数据结构,将一段时间内接收到的交易数据和代码封装到一个带有时间戳的数据区块中,并链接到当前最长的主区块链上, 形成最新的区块,该过程涉及区块、链式结构、哈希算法、Merkle 树和时间戳等技术要素。哈希函数是指将原始数据编码为特定长度的由数字和字母组成的字符串后记入区块链。Merkle 树则是是快速归纳和校验区块数据的存在性和完整性。

而区块链系统实际上分为多个层面:由数据层、网络层、共识层、激励层、合约层和应用层。而 DT 君刚才说到的,仅仅是数据层。该层的主要作用是封装底层数据区块以及相关的数据加密和时间戳等技术; 网络层则包括分布式组网机制、数据传播机制和数据验证机制等; 共识层主要封装网络节点的各类共识算法; 激励层将经济因素集成到区块链技术体系中来, 主要包括经济激励的发行机制和分配机制等; 合约层主要封装各类脚本、算法和智能合约, 是区块链可编程特性的基础; 应用层则封装了区块链的各种应用场景和案例。


在使用区块链技术的比特币中,共识层就是比特币去中心化优势的重点所在。而共识层的判断依据,则普遍为 Proof of work,即 PoW。其核心思想是通过引入分布式节点的算力竞争来保证数据一致性和共识的安全性。比特币系统中, 各节点 (即矿工) 基于各自的计算机算力相互竞争来共同解决一个求解复杂但验证容易的 SHA256 数学难题 (即挖矿), 最快解决该难题的节点将获得区块记账权和系统自动生成的比特币奖励。说白了就是业绩,多干多得,少干少得。


说到这,PoW 的优势已经非常明显了,它整合了比特币系统的货币发行、交易支付和验证等功能, 并通过算力竞争保障系统的安全性和去中心性。然而在 DT 君看来,其缺点也暴露无遗,其强大算力造成的资源浪费 (如电力) 历来为研究者所诟病,而且长达 10 分钟的交易确认时间使其相对不适合小额交易的商业应用。

除此以外,基于 PoW 共识过程的区块链主要面临的是 51% 攻击问题, 即节点通过掌握全网超过 51% 的算力就有能力成功篡改和伪造区块链数据。以比特币为例, 据统计中国大型矿池的算力已占全网总算力的 60% 以上, 理论上这些矿池可以通过合作实施 51% 攻击, 从而实现比特币的双重支付。当然,仅从计算机和互联网技术上来判断是不够的,还要从金融市场来分析。那么,被称作是比特币的加密货币,它是货币吗?并不是。事实上,比特币更应该被理解成为一种证券,因它符合了证券的 6 大特点:

1. 证券是特定主体为了筹集资金而向受众发行;

2. 证券实质是一种权利,包括物权、债权、股权等;

3. 该权利被划分为众多等额部分;

4. 该权利具有高度流通性,可以在交易场所转让和变现;

5. 投资者支付对价,该对价既包括货币也包括其它财产性利益;

6. 该权利风险与收益同在。

但许多企业把比特币看作是一种支付手段,把商品的交易价值换算成比特币的数量,这等同于货币。恰巧是这样的行为,促使了比特币被操纵的可能性。这是因为比特币区别于现行金融体系的第三方发行货币,它不存在信用。在 P2P 网络中人们自愿信任并使用这种挖掘算法与流通验证方式。然而,货币的价值和信用是有关的,缺乏信用体系,货币的价值势必会被卖家操纵,比如贬值等。另外,比特币革命性的不与现实货币建立价值锚点(不从外部注入流动性),算法导致初期获取比特币成本几乎为零,后期挖掘难度又将呈指数化递增。随着加入挖掘人数的增加比特币创造成本剧增,进而产生强烈的升值预期心理,先入者只需坐等价值飙升,后进者则受到重利诱惑积极抢进,一个可能的庞氏骗局疑点就此出现。


从 PoW 共识机制来看,区块链的非对称加密机制也将随着数学、密码学和计算技术的发展而变的越来越脆弱。据估计, 以目前天河二号的算力来说, 产生比特币 SHA256 哈希算法的一个哈希碰撞大约需要 248 年。但从金融市场来看,以前的比特币可以被轻易操纵,但在各种监管势力加入干预后,确实有机会让比特币市场的秩序受到管控。2015 年 5 月 5 日,美国处理了一起违规的数字货币业务,美国财政部金融犯罪执法网络(FinCEN) 针对 Ripple 公司的违规事件处以 70 万美元的罚款,在这起违规事件中,Ripple 承认其违反了几个 BSA 规定,包括兑换和汇款。虽然 Ripple 依据 FinCEN 的规定注册了货币服务业务,但其 XRP 的销售行为没有遵守适当的反洗钱(AML)程序,没有对业务申请独立审查。

2015 年 6 月 3 日,纽约州金融服务局发布了名为“BitLicense”的数字货币业务监管框架。虽然目前它对 BitLicense 的长期市场影响还无法定论,但它提高了区块链参与者的进入成本,并且为区块链对接到银行系统铺平道路。该规则覆盖了大部分数字货币业务活动,涉及“数字货币”的定义和数字货币的商业活动,前者包括基于区块链的数字货币;后者包括发送数字货币、代持数字货币、代理客户买卖数字货币、提供汇兑服务和控制、管理或发行数字货币。

规则承认数字货币具有货币价值,而不去争论它在现行法律下是否完全符合“货币”的定义。纽约的监管机构监管数字货币特定的活动:传输、交流和销售,确保相关企业拥有为公众提供金融服务的执照,而且区块链的应用升级、创业融资和电子钱包等也在监管范围。而数字货币的矿工,多重签名软件和区块链 2.0 实体如智能合约等则不在监管范围之内。而这些国家监管机构的介入,变相地成为了比特币等加密货币的中心,原本“去中心化”的优势不复存在。所谓操纵比特币是一种阴谋论,在各国监控介入之前或许可能,但如今看来,略微有些困难。





其中,腾讯于 20 日正式发布区块链白皮书,在这份白皮书资料中,通篇只提到两次“货币”,一次谈的是数字货币是区块链运行的工具,另一个谈的是可以将比特币用于慈善事业的运作,淡化区块链与比特币关联的用意非常明显。而腾讯在白皮书则是大唱另一种调,强调的是“区块链带来了效率提升和成本降低的技术手段,为经济社会发展和治理提供新的思路。围绕区块链体系,能够创造出丰富的产品和服务,人们可以在相互无信任的情况下,无地域限制地进行大规模协作。由此,一个全新的经济时代展现在公众面前。”

腾讯口中的这个全新的经济时代,指的是“到 2025 年之前,全球 GDP 总量的 10% 将利用区块链技术储存。”事实上,近来有多份研究报告相继提出目前已然用于不同行业、公部门、国家机构的区块币应用机制,其中包含金融、物联网、公共服务、公益慈善、供应链、智慧城市等等。相较于腾讯发布区块链白皮书,近来则是已有外媒报道,阿里巴巴、京东内部都已开始导入区块链技术,为商品提供所谓的“电子护照”确保生产来源质量。而这些互联网大牛们近来对于区块链技术表态,确实有些想要正本清源的味道,但从另一个角度来看,加密货币如果在这样漫山遍野的烧下去,接下来要烧到的很可能就是腾讯、阿里巴巴这些公司身上。也就是因为如此,与其说这些互联网公司如今大张旗鼓的站在所谓的“正宗”区块链那一边,是为了悍卫未来技术的发展,却也很难不让人揣想,加密货币可能为互联网服务、金融支付体系所造成的颠覆效应,或许才是这些大公司最担心的问题。

因此,今年必然会看到所有互联网、新零售、甚至人工智能企业相继对外发布区块链白皮书、战略规划,但重点类似,就是将区块链技术导入既有服务、然后强调区块链的安全性等等。其中,美图就在 1 月 22 日宣布其首部区块链白皮书,宣布将基于 AI 技术打造区块链生态,创建一个去中心化、安全加密的美图智能通行证(MIP – Meitu Intelligent Passport),让用户能够在区块链上用人脸特征作为通证密钥,进行去中心化的用户身份认证(KYC)。美图区块链白皮书中虽然试图提及多个面向,但主要仍聚焦在安全性,显示美图内部认为,导入区块链技术最快可显现的价值,就是安全性的提升,其中包括用户身份、交易信息、第三方合作伙伴接口权限等等。除了安全之外,以美图的业务属性来看,产品溯源也会是一个很大的区块链应用热点,美图在白皮书中虽着墨不多,却也特别提到,通过导入区块链可有效把控、追踪交易环节及路径。






这篇是 1981 年哈耶克在 VISA 国际信用卡的年会上发表《未来的价值单位》的讲话。是哈耶克晚年最后一本经济学专著《货币的非国家化》发表后,再次补充和论述自由货币竞争理论的一段演讲。谨以分享,致敬。






这种想法在我的脑海中悄然生成,15年后,由于对我们的货币形势日益恶化的局面越来越不满,于是,我就提出——差不多是作为一个天大的玩笑 —— 一项建议,鉴于事态如此发展,我们重新获得一种健全货币的唯一希望在于,我们必须剥夺政府发行货币的垄断权,将这个任务交给私人企业。我在严肃考察后发现,这种设想越来越具有吸引力,最后我觉得,这种方案是解决我们目前在各国看到的越来越令人绝望的货币形势的唯一切实可行的方案。然后,我在一本小册子《货币的非国家化》中系统地阐述了这种想法,大大扩充了的第二版已于1978年出版。



在鼓吹自由供应货币理论的时候,我的基本观点是,人人都可以自由地向公众供应具有自己的名称的货币。将由公众最后来决定,这些货币中哪一种会获得普遍地接受。如果我们认识到,在讨论自由银行业务(free banking)和货币自由发行(free issue of money)的时候,人们谈论的其实只是私人机构也发行政府发行的那些货币,比如美元、英镑等等,两相对照,我提出的这个新建议的特征就比较清楚了。如果私人机构发行了政府发行的货币,私人机构确实可以被指控造成了这些货币贬值及通货膨胀的局面。但如果私人机构发行的是自己的货币,具有自己专有的名称,那么,公众立刻就会将它与其他货币区别开来。在一个真正竞争性的格局中,货币的发行者将不得不采取种种措施,使自己的货币对公众最有吸引力,使公众最乐于持有他发行的货币而不是其他人发行的货币。













政府警惕地守护着自己的垄断权,不是为了实现人们引入货币的最初目的,而是为了实现另外的目的。今天,货币已经主要不是一种有效率的交换媒介,而是政府欺诈掠夺我们和“管理”经济的一件工具。结果就是,我们不得不承认,对于各种可以设想得到的供应货币的办法到底会如何运转,我们几乎没有什么经验证据,而对于下面的问题,我们也几乎无从回答:假定公众有机会自由地在几种不同而可以清晰辨别的货币中间进行选择,他们会选择什么样的货币?对于这些问题,我们恐怕主要得依靠我们的理论想象(theoretical imagination ),应当努力地将我们对于其他领域中竞争发挥作用的情况的理解,运用于这一特殊领域中。









一个重要的问题——我也承认对此问题我并没有明确清晰的答案——是:如果人们可以在若干不同的货币之间进行自由选择,他们是否肯定会选择那种购买力将会保持最大限度的稳定的货币?当然,从下面的问题开始探讨可能更为恰当:我们期望从一种良好的货币中得到什么,什么有可能诱使个体选择某种良好的货币?当然,我们知道,人们将货币用作某种交换媒介的一般原因是,这样一种商品具有较高程度的“可被接受性”(accepta-bility), 也就是说,比起其他商品来,它更容易被人接受。后来,“可被接受性”一词经常被换成“流动性”(liquidity),这很有助益,因为流动性一词凸显了货币中长期被人忽视的另一面。这涉及到货币与商品的区分问题。不同的商品具有程度不等的流动性。如果你想要完全的流动性,你实际上就处于基础货币的一端。然后,是与其关系的密切程度不等的替代品。其范围从流动性最高的黄金到完全没有流动性的某类商品。这种区分很重要,因为它揭示了,另一个概念——货币稳定性的概念——不是一个模糊的概念。假定我们没有被强迫必须在很短时间内售出某种商品,则该商品的价值就可能是稳定的。至于货币,即使几种货币具有同等程度的可被接受性,但它们所具有的稳定性却仍有可能程度不同。








不过,我并不能完全肯定,经常被人忽视的货币可能导致的误导性效应,是否能够最终被一种保持平稳购买力的货币完全矫正。保持平稳购买力或保持平均价格平稳的货币也可能扰乱相对价格的结构(structure of relative prices),也就是说,会扰乱生产要素的配置。我在我以前有关货币与商业周期的著作中已经指出过,货币数量的变化必然会导致相对价格结构的紊乱。增发的货币必然会临时拉髙那些吸收了这些货币的商品之价格。只要货币数量的增加持续下去,由此导致的相对价格的变动就会维持下去。这就意味着,生产要素将会被引导到这些商品的生产活动中去,而只有在通货持续膨胀的情况下,这些要素才能被用于该生产中。















这免不了会引出一个问题:我们需要的是区域性货币还是国际性货币。我自己的选择是倾向于一种国际性货币。这就意味着,我们应当致力于使价格在国际范围内保持稳定。应当清楚的一点是,在这里所勾勒的,仅仅是我本人对于人们如果可以自由地从多种竞争性货币当中作出选择的时候将会追求什么样的目标的暂时结论。我相信,这样一种竞争将会引导人们选择出一种购买力将保持稳定的货币,而此处之购买力如果是用国际性本位(international standard)表示之购买力,则更为可取。


为了保持国际经济之高效运转,我们显然需要某些国际性本位,而唯一能让我们赖以获得实时信息的国际性价格体系,乃是那些被极为广泛地交易的标准化的原材料之批发价格,因而,最能准确地显示一种货币单位之购买力保持普遍稳定的办法,可能就是这些原材料的价格指数保持平稳。当然,这样一种指数必须是所谓的加权指数,不管是其商品组成还是各种商品的权重,都不可能严格保持不变。持有这样一种货币单位的人可以随时赎回可供购进用以规定该本位单位的不同原材料之组合的其他货币;这样一种货币的发行者有权改变这些商品的名单,根据每种商品在交易中的重要性的变化而调整其权重。不过,为了保护持有该货币的民众,不对他们掩盖该货币价值的变动情况,发行者必须向持有人保证,新的“一篮子”商品的构成虽然会有所调整,但按市场现价计算的总价值,会等于旧的篮子”商品的总价值(而且,有可能在一个限定的较短时期内,该货币单位的持有人可以选择是赎回新篮子”商品还是旧“ 一篮子”商品)。


由某一具体的发钞机构提供的这样一种新的国际性货币单位当然必须有自己的名字,在下面的讨论中,我姑且将其称为佐力德。这样一种试验能否成功,很大程度上得看发钞者选择的货币单位名称是否有吸引力,是否恰如其分。我已经想出了一个在这方面比现在想出来的这个名字更有吸引力的货币单位名称,这样的名字确实能够价值连城。但由于法律顾问告诉我说,在目前的法律下,只有那些实际从事某项业务的个人或企业的商标(或著作权)才能获得法律保护,因此,我没有办法,只好保守我的秘密,在这儿,使用佐力德作为一个次优名称,用来说明我的私人发行货币的方案;尽管必然会遇到政府的阻挠,但肯定是可以引进这样的货币单位的——当然,最初的时候,不会是流通性的符号性货币(circulating tokens),其形态可表现为某种可赎回目前的日常交易货币或者政府眼下可能不会允许私人发行的符号性货币的可转让的存款(transferable deposits )。























因此,十分自然的是,银行家们成了这样一群人,他们觉得,让自己在这种新制度下与他人展开竞争,是最不可行的。我本人只成功地说服过经济学家与刚刚进入经济生活舞台的年轻人相信竞争性发行货币的优越性,让他们相信,实行这种制度,其实并不存在根本性困难。但我必须承认,我还从来没有说服过一位银行家相信这种制度是可行的。他们都抱怨说,这种制度与现在人们眼中的银行业务完全不同,他们担心,传统的银行业务将会消失。但我希望指出,我们现在所说的银行业务,其实只存在了一个半世纪,也就是在中央银行普遍地建立起来之后,在银行业务成为一门以存在着所谓的最后贷款人为本的生意之后。银行家们尤其忘记了一段著名的话,1844年的皮尔法案(Peel’ Act)通过的时候,一位英国银行家曾引过这段话,“我不需要一家准备银行——我的准备金就在这儿”,他用手指着他的银行的地下室的方向这样说。我相信,如果我们实行竞争发行货币的制度,取消了最终流动性资金的垄断性供应者,我们就可以拥有这样一种银行体系:每种货币的发行者或银行家将会建立一定数量的准备金;根据需要,用商品或其他货币的组合来保证他自己发行的货币的稳定。





我在我的书中研究过若干其他后果,在这里,我只更为深人地探讨一下其中一个问题,当时我甚至没有想到,但现在看来,是最为重要的一个问题。在我看来,如果能够出现一种不依赖于任何人的专断意志的稳定的新型国际性价值单位,那么,它的影响要比乍一看显而易见的那些后果还要深人广泛。如果在这个世界上流通着若干种具有不同名称的货币单位,每一种都只有在其与其他大多数货币保持同样价值的情况下才能维持下去,那么,即使其中一种由于政策失误或管理人员违规操作导致崩溃,其冲击也不会像今天某种货币崩溃那样大。持有某种部分或全部地丧失其价值的通货之结存的人,当然会损失其一切,就跟今天一样。但今天由于某种通货之贬值而造成的最严重的损失,不是落在那些确实持有一定数量该通货的人头上,而是落在那些以该货币订立合同而形成债权的人头上。我在《货币的非国家化》第二版中(第124 -125页)中曾解释过这一点: